Experimental History?
The ‘Space’ of History in Recent Kimberley Colonial Histories

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Experimentation involves using simple or complex investigative procedures, with a particular aim in mind, to vary or modify natural phenomena and make them appear in circumstances or under conditions which nature does not provide for them.¹

Groucho Marx, on becoming a hotel manager, orders the room numbers to be changed. Someone protests, ‘But think of the confusion!’ Groucho: ‘But think of the fun!’²

The debates about that space will be endless. Will it be a vaginal slash in the earth? Will it be stiff and erect? Will it be black or white? Whose names will be upon it?³

In 1991 Daniel S Milo and his friends in Paris, constituting a working group in ‘experimental history’, published a volume of essays entitled Alter Histoire.⁴ Their obsession was to:

liberate the imagination of the historian, admire the force of the possible, intervene in order to spread disorder. This libertarian attitude carried with it certain polemics: a refusal of history as reenactment and the dogma of the opacity of the past, and a distrust of systems of description and explanation.⁵

Their method? The practice of an experimental history which
would systematically defamiliarise and displace historical objects.

The ‘experimental’ has different senses across the two domains of science and art. Science has been experimental ever since Galileo, and the experimental in art would seem to have a shorter history. We talk freely of experimental writing as if its effects were harmless because they are sequestered in aesthetic domains, and in laboratories scientists pursue the testing of their hypotheses with experimental methods so well-established they furnish few surprises. The aspect of the experimental that I would like to borrow from science is that which would have us test things out, which would not only mean comparing and contrasting, juxtaposing conflicting accounts and testing them against facts (and on new equipment), but also, in a human discipline like history, against the end product of historical work which is the audiences constituted as part of historical formations, for history will only be history if it is read and made sense of.

The experimental in the creative arts draws more closely on the libertarianism of Milo and co. or the Dada connections of Groucho Marx. Here one has to be a little more cautious since one is playing on the edge of irresponsibility. In order not to be totally haphazard, this play has to make some kind of sense. For instance, a ‘safe’ disregard for patriarchal histories could lead one into fertile territory occupied by those hungry for women’s and postcolonial histories (Tunisian proverb: Take advice from the elders, then do the opposite). At the same time, it would seem that making sense of history means to keep non-sense in view at the horizon of one’s thought and practice. Experimental history implies a gap between what has made sense in the past, and what no longer makes sense, whether it is past events or new ones demanding to be gathered into the fold of meaning.

These events as historical events are not always presented and re-presented to us in a perfectly clear historical frame. There is a bleeding of signification across literary, cultural and historical domains, as some of the other pieces in this issue also show. In schools in Australia, cinema might be used in history classrooms as a memory device, as if Peter Weir’s Gallipoli were somehow a close enough representation of the
ANZAAC legend, yet would these same teachers consider using *Number 96* episodes to examine the sixties? Probably not, but the importance of the audio-visual archive and the part it plays in fabricating historical memory is certainly underestimated at the moment.

In the case of Aboriginal history in Australia, the ‘discovery’ of spaces beyond the frontier and pre-1788 forced a radical reconceptualisation of national histories. The gap between sense of what ‘we always knew’ and non-sense of Aborigines as historical is most often elided in accounts which proceed step by step, from one certainty to the next. To the extent that histories are considered ‘creative’ they allow for the temporal or spatial gap between the established and the new, the mundane and the wondrous. They concede that the process of ‘making sense’ depends on it, and that there is a surplus or a dimension of excess in every object. History will then operate with uncertainty as much as certainty, holding that every act of memory is also an act of forgetting. For what is forgotten is not the unfortunate down-side of memory, the lack; it is as systematic as the processes of memory.

Jorge Luis Borges helps, as always, by providing us with an intellectual limit case, the case of Funes the Memorious who could forget nothing:

He remembered the shapes of the clouds in the south at dawn on the 30th of April of 1882, and he could compare them in his recollection with the marbled grain in the design of a leather-bound book which he had seen only once, and with the lines in the spray which an oar raised in the Rio Negro on the eve of the battle of Quebracho.

Living in a world intolerably replete with particulars, he was incapable of generalisation. Therefore, as the narrator says, he was incapable of thought: ‘To think is to forget a difference, to generalise, to abstract.’ Writing history then, would also be a way of thinking. And since we only know what is thought through inscription, then experiments with historiography become all-important.

For some time now, as Curthoys and Docker, historians have conceded that the medium for the transmission of
historical knowledge is not neutral in relation to that information: it narrativises it, stages it theatrically, and gives it points of view.¹⁰ No doubt an ‘experimental history for beginners’ would start with a simple point of view exercise: a spatial intervention in the chronological tradition: Describe a series of events from one side of the room, then from the other; now from a woman’s point of view, now from the other side of the frontier, and so on.¹¹

For Aboriginal history the mode of inscription is highly significant, as oral histories compete for space with the alphabetic writings of historians. I have discussed this elsewhere,¹² but the point is underscored by Mary Carruthers as cited by John Frow:

anything that encodes information in order to stimulate the memory to store or retrieve information is ‘writing’, whether it be alphabet, hieroglyph, ideogram American Indian picture writing, or Inca knot writing.¹³

Significantly, for the Kimberley histories I discuss below, the medieval notion of the locus of memory as discussed by Carruthers and Frow is that writing is not an external support for memory, but a mode of memorisation practised in specific places. Similarly Aboriginal ‘histories’ are encoded in places, writing and reading them involves travelling through the country as if the country itself were the text of history. Frow, most importantly, concludes:

it is only by working out the implications or “writing” (in these senses) for memory that we can avoid the nostalgic essentialism that affirms the reality of an origin by proclaiming its loss.¹⁴

One of the greatest ‘experiments’ in recent Australian history is no doubt the recovery of pre-invasion events as part of national history: a whole new domain of positivity is forged under the slogan ‘Australia has an Aboriginal Past’. I think we should take Frow’s lesson to heart and say that this is a positivity, rather than morally declaiming the loss of a history that was ‘always there’.¹⁵ Relieved of the negative drag of nostalgia,
this positivity opens a whole new space and brings with it additions to method (for example, the use of ‘myth’ or oral sources). And it challenges established authority, highlighting the erstwhile neutral domain for the production and consumption of historical truth, which ‘they’ are calling ‘Academic History.’ A modesty, a shrinkage of the range of truth, has been forced on these practitioners in ways described by Dipesh Chakrabarty in his review of *Telling the Truth about History*.

Was this creation of Aboriginal History revisionism? Perhaps. But those who cast the stone of revisionism will have to deal with all the critiques of the Hegelian dictum that certain non-European societies ‘lacked historicity’. History has been both demanded by and delivered to Aboriginal Australia in ways that are massively significant for the emergent redefinition of the nation under republicanism. The consequences for the introduction of temporality in a set of societies traditionally basing their ontologies on space has fascinating implications which have been traced by Tony Swain. Meanwhile experiments go on, for instance with Klaus Neuman, who in ‘A Postcolonial Writing of Aboriginal History,’ employs a textual device as he sarcastically challenges conventional historiography:

The following is a comprehensive, concise, chronological account of black-white relations in Australia between 1 January 1980 and 31 May 1989. The exactness of the dates has been established by extensive research carried out between 1987 and 1991 by a team of specialists competent in a diverse range of fields of knowledge, including sociology, law, pathology and history:

Karen Lee O’Rourke, 11 February 1980.
Darryl Horace Garlett, 26 May 1980.
Jambajimba, 16 June 1980.
Jabanardi, 29 July 1980.
Christine Lesley Ann Jones, 18 October 1980.
(...)

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And this list of recent Aboriginal deaths in custody continues for some four pages; I should not have abridged it. The historical technique of the chronology is strikingly non-Aboriginal and underscores Neuman’s point about the arbitrary generation of truth effects by the *sine qua non* of historical writing: no dates; no history.20 It resembles the recitations of royal succession or the lives of famous men. More significantly, it resembles the lists on monuments to the ‘glorious’ war dead, placed in thousands of country towns which have ‘forgotten’ the Aboriginal wars; the wars which this list proclaims are still going on. What mode of inscription ‘best’ remembers the past? What space and form should the memorial have?, Greg Dening asks. It seems a formal violence will have to be done to a history covering up material violences; the experiments may take the form of metaphors which defamiliarise the objects of history, new ways of telling stories, non-alphabetic representations, new technologies, as in the multimedia experiments of Heather Goodall, juxtapositions of competing accounts, sensitivity to rhetoric and audiences, and the fragmentation of national histories into regional ones.21

**Jandamarra vs Nyibayarri**

Two recent books about Kimberley history can conveniently be contrasted to develop my argument that history has spatial as much as temporal coordinates.22 Both are ‘colonial’ histories in that they work to recover periods of rapid colonial expansion in the central Kimberley areas from late last century into the twentieth century. They are about conflict over the land as both Jandamarra and Nyibayarri were implicated in the battles over occupation of country, the former man working initially for the police and later against them, and the latter coming a generation later, but consistently working as a police tracker at Fitzroy Crossing. Jandamarra (Pigeon) is celebrated as a hero of the Bunaba and Nyibayarri (Jack Bohemia) would be a countryman of his, being from the Gooniyandi, a closely related Bunaban group.

The two books are written by white men, though in partnership with the custodians or narrators of the stories. Bill McGregor is a linguist, and his book ‘comes out of’ Canberra, and, it seems to me, the kinds of metropolitan ways
that knowledge is shaped in the South East of the continent. Pederson works for the Kimberley Land Council, and has published with a local press in Broome. Magabala Press’s involvement in the revival of Kimberley politics and culture parallels that of the KLC. A sense of regionalism pervades the Jandamarra book which cannot be matched by the academic ‘distance’ in the construction of the Nyibayarri one. The conflation of the political with the historical emerges most strikingly for me at this point in Jandamarra:

In early 1992, less than one hundred years after Jandamarra’s death, the Bunaba took back Leopold Downs station following its purchase by the Federal Government. The country was handed back without fanfare, or any public recognition that hundreds of Bunaba had died in its defence only a few generations earlier.

... The Bunaba renamed the station Yaranggi and now conduct it as one of the most successful cattle operations in the Kimberley. For the first time in nearly forty years young boys now go through the ceremonies of induction to Bunaba law in the country of Jandamarra. Life and culture has returned to the land.23

It is no accident that the grandson of a Bunaba woman, Peter Yu, is chair of the KLC and is working closely with Pederson and Woorunmurra. For twenty years he has worked not only on land issues but also on various cultural ones, including a possible feature movie of the Jandamarra story. There is a sense that this recent work has introduced history for Aboriginal people into a region where aboriginality was bracketed out of time and out of history. The colonial history of settlement has now been unsettled by a different possible destiny as the colonial industries—pastoral, pearling, mining—are running out of steam.

Yu, against the fierce pressure of Richard Court’s conservative state government, has been pushing for regional autonomy, ‘a form of Aboriginal self-government’ on a ticket of ‘resource management’ of a wide range of services for a part of the country half the size of New South Wales where at least half of the 23,000 people are Aboriginal.24 Should Yu be
successful, the Bunaba victory will be complete. Aboriginal people will be back in control of their resources after only one hundred years or so of colonial administration. However, it cannot be a return to traditional cultures in the sense of the immutable law of ‘the dreaming’. A time line has been introduced which makes Aboriginal politics engage with the forms and functions of broader Australian life. His organisation has its political opponents, and a plurality of expectations and explanations is now part of Kimberley cultural life.

So there are different accounts of the famous Jandamarra. His representation as ‘rebel’ or guerilla fighter has been challenged by McGregor, who says that some historians have constructed the actions of Aborigines killing cattle or white people on the frontier as those of:

brigands or resistance fighters of the likes of Robin Hood and Che Guevara. However none of these works put forward compelling arguments that resistance or rebellion are appropriate designations. Aborigines may have killed whites and their stock for a variety of reasons—acknowledged by Reynolds himself (1981, 69–70)—including misunderstandings, sacrilege, revenge, kidnapping of women, and so on, and even to hazard a guess would necessitate that ethnographic considerations, not to say detailed consideration of each individual case, be taken into account.

McGregor is no doubt right that ‘resistance’ is a kind of macro term used to explain a situation politically, where other aspects of the more general situation enter the picture, like the ‘cooperation’ of the subject of his own biographical work: Jack Bohemia as Police Tracker (McGregor is nervous about his book being seen as ‘ideologically unsound’). Strangely though, McGregor goes on to list, above, a series of reasons why ‘resistance’ might not be too bad a summary term (and later Bohemia offers a motivation for Pigeon killing the policeman Richardson, the appropriation of his wife: ‘roowoo moorninynga [shit:he:fucked:her] “he fucked the shit out of her”’). Twenty seventh-century Aborigines, having not yet heard
of Che Guevara, did not construct themselves as resistance fighters either, so their reactions to the intolerability of the situations arising were coded in their own terms, as I learnt from another narrator of the Pigeon story:

the following example ... is another account of Pigeon, this time giving us a clue as to the reason why he killed a white settler:

(...)  
Well him bin come out la [there]: ‘Oh Gooday boss’—
‘Gooday’ him bin tell-im—  
‘Gooday’—
he never have-im rifle like this, him bin come up [with] nothing—
Him bin leave-im rifle that way him bin gone out—
‘Ah—
I think you better give me one flour’ him bin tell-im—
‘No well, not mine this ‘un, he longa [belongs to] white people, you can’t cut-im [separate] flour—
yeah—
I can give you lil’ bit flour, yeah, mine one.’—
Alright, him bin give-it-im—
him bin go back—
him bin go right up longa creek—
him bin get that rifle—
him bin come up belonga that, what name, him bin jump up longa sharp—
I dunno, something he bin fix-im—
him bin give-it-im [shoot him] straight here—
Finish—
(...) 28

Had the settler obeyed the Aboriginal legal code, he would have shared his cart-load of flour equally with Pigeon instead of giving him a derisory amount (‘lil’ bit’). So Pigeon ‘inflicts the death penalty’ (...) Pigeon and his gang seemed to be campaigning against the European ‘invasion’. But since the concept of invasion was not coded as an infraction of Aboriginal law, the narrative now justifies the killing in terms of not sharing food properly. Greed, or
failure to share property, is an element which articulates stories throughout Aboriginal Australia, forming a major element of Aboriginal ideology and standing directly in opposition to English common law which gives priority to the possessor of property.²⁹

Another point needs to be picked up from McGregor above: his call for ‘ethnographic considerations... detailed consideration of each case’ to work out the truth of the matter. It has to be pointed out that to anthropologise difference, or to empirically determine situations is to have recourse to other master codes, in this case the social sciences, where the master code of history may be in doubt. In the Pigeon case, other modes of knowing may be uppermost in the minds (and practice) of Aboriginal subjects: spirituality and magic are consistently evoked in stories about him. McGregor does not take these concepts or ‘cultural operators’ seriously but they are folded into Pederson’s narrative. This is where McGregor’s linguistic/social scientific interests fail him in the pursuit of history: he is not interested in what his subjects say, only how they say it. A more sensitive ethnography, such as that of Favret-Saada, takes seriously the terms in which the subjects articulate their experience and attributes them with the power of explanation.³⁰ So we would have to listen, in the case of Jandamarra, to the consistency of the accounts which say that Jandamarra could only be defeated when his spiritual power was matched by that of Roebourne Mick, a tracker brought in for the purpose of subduing the Kimberley blacks when the settlers were at their wits’ end.

It was no doubt unwise to set these two books up against each other. Each has its virtues and its failings. That is, in the case of Jandamarra, if it is a failing or a virtue to compromise ‘Aboriginal’ understandings of events by opting for a racy narrative style which commits all the sins of using non-Aboriginal discourse features which Bohemia and Aboriginal narrators generally do not use: the development of psychological motivations for characters, setting descriptive scenes, orientation in time rather than place. The result is that Jandamarra, without seriously compromising historical fact, is more readable for a general audience than Nyibayarrri is. It is a ‘regional’ history,
the most complete account the Jandamarra story to date, sympathetic to the political concerns of Kimberley Aboriginal people, past and present, and narrated by Pederson who is a great storyteller in his own right.

_Nyibayarri_ is a more complex work, replete with historical, linguistic and anthropological detail. It is a valuable contribution to the assessment of the role of trackers in Aboriginal history, but only hangs together as a book because of the unifying force of the (self)-portrait of Jack Bohemia. McGregor speaks with that strange assurance—becoming stranger in these ‘postcolonial’ times—with which the discourses of the social sciences provide him. While postcolonial and cultural studies have tools for seriously critiquing his approach, they will also recognise, I think, that there is a lot of useful work there which will contribute to further ‘experiments’ in Australian history.

**Reflection**

When I wrote this piece 18 years ago it was with a more adversarial attitude than I was to have later with the ‘Captain Cook’ essay (also in this volume). Keith Windschuttle’s polemical _The Killing of History_ had come out in 1994, railing against postmodernism and ‘theory’, setting up his more detailed _The Fabrication of Aboriginal History_ (2002). I’m glad I used that key word ‘fabricating’ positively in this piece: (‘the importance of the audio-visual archive and the part it plays in fabricating historical memory is certainly underestimated at the moment’) because that is the main point I want to elaborate in this reflection.

Facts are indeed ‘fabricated’ and we have learned from Bruno Latour that a useful line of inquiry might be to think of them as well or badly fabricated,31 in this particular case according to the protocols and methods of historical research. The crucial shift here is away from thinking of them as simply sitting out there waiting to be collected. If we accept that historical facts are carefully constructed, they must also be nurtured to stay alive (which was my point about the film Gallipoli’s role in teaching). Without institutional support, facts and methods can easily disappear, but with new methods and new concerns, different sets of facts appear (anathema to Windschuttle types!). At the University of Technology, Sydney, conversations with Paula Hamilton were happening at the time, and her _Memory and History in Twentieth_
Century Australia had come out in 1994. The concerns of history were expanding into popular memory, and Hamilton’s book made very good sense to me as it debated and then put into place the kinds of historical material that was in the popular press and popular memory. The notion of the experimental continued from the experimental history issue of the UTS Review into the pages of the Cultural Studies Review (vol. 14, no. 1, 2008), when it joined the interests Tara Forrest had in Frankfurt School experimentalism, for where would all this be without Walter Benjamin at the start, and then, for Tara’s work, Kracauer and Kluge?

For those who want to follow up more of the connections to Kimberley history, which, by the way, is largely yet to be written, could look at Mitch Torres’ film Jandamarra’s War (2011), which benefitted a lot from the ground-breaking historical work of Howard Pedersen (with Banjo Woorunmurra), Jandamarra and the Bunuba Resistance (1995).\(^2\) Real blood was spilt in those real historical wars, wars that could have been forgotten were it not for the elaboration of historical methods that could hear popular and oral accounts, that could embrace technologies like the tape recorder, and that were not in thrall to the official written document. In the twentieth century ‘history’, ‘culture’ and ‘science’ wars only time, energy and printers’ ink were wasted. Wasted? Perhaps. What I find interesting now is that polemics like Sokal and Windschuttle ambushed the enemy. I am sure if Windschuttle had talked to a few Aboriginal public intellectuals his tune might have changed. Or if he had engaged debate at our seminars with Dipesh Chakrabarty, it would not have been the case of keeping his powder dry before later going into battle with the support of the Howard government and the Australian newspaper. This desire to go straight to war, avoiding that other great and now diminished institution of diplomacy is, for me at least, not unconnected to the Tory enthusiasm for war and an education system which treats wars as major historical drivers (as opposed to the 40-hour working week, the suffragettes, etc.).

So what I would like to propose now is experiments in diplomacy in culture and history wars, again drawing on Latour. Skilled diplomats will be given a brief to negotiate on behalf of the disputing parties. The negotiation will not be between the veracity of facts and the distortions of ideology; peace will never be achieved along that pathway. The negotiations have to be
conducted respectfully, and diplomats know how to talk to people in their own discourses. They will talk until they find out what are the most cherished values that are supporting the manufacture and maintenance of the historical facts that are serving both (or all the different) sides. The diplomats’ intervention involves listening to what it is the parties hold most dear, and then negotiating what each is prepared to relinquish to achieve a workable peace. This would be disappointing for the newspapers who so enjoy reporting a good fight; they might have to imagine new pleasures on behalf of their readers. These might be akin to the excitement of discovery that accompanies scientific experimentation. In that way a new idea in the humanities—a well-fabricated one!—might be set shining before the public, rather than being shipped straight out to be mutilated in its prime.

Notes
1 Thanks to Benno Wagner for showing me the copy of Alter Histoire, and to Meaghan Morris for comments on an earlier version of this paper. Daniel S. Milo and Alain Boureau (eds), Alter Histoire: Essais d’histoire expérimentale Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 1991. The manifesto essay by Milo is called ‘Pour une histoire expérimentale, ou le gai savoir’ (pp. 9-55) and has proved a useful basis for this introduction. Claude Bernard, Introduction a l’ etude de la medecine expérimentale, Flammarion Paris, 1985 [1865], p. 45, cited in Milo and Boureau, p. 13.
2 A Night in Casablanca, cited in Milo and Boureau, p. 9
4 Milo and Boureau.
5 Milo and Boureau, Alter Histoire, back cover.
6 ‘Experience’, ‘experiment’ and ‘expert’ are all cognates, deriving from the Latin experiri, ‘to try thoroughly’.
7 Dipesh Chakrabarty puts this point another way. The political-ethical task of the historian is to attend to ‘the fractures in the semiotic field called “history” so that what is unrepresentable is at least allowed to make visible the laws and limits of a system of representation’. Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘Marx after Marxism: History, Subalternity, and Difference’, in positions, vol. 2, no. 2, 1994, p. 461.
11 Henry Reynolds, The Other Side of the Frontier, James Cook University, Townsville, 1981.


13 Frow, p. 8.
14 See also Chakrabarty, ‘it is always possible to discover “history” (say after European contact) even if you were not aware of its existence in the past’ (p. 459).
20 Heather Goodall, Working with History: Experiments in Aboriginal History and Hypermedia, UTS Review, vol. 2, no.1, pp. 43-57.
23 McGregor in Bohemia and McGregor, p. 42. He refers, among other examples, to Henry Reynolds’s The Other Side of the Frontier and an earlier version of Pederson’s work on Pigeon.
24 Bohemia and McGregor, p. 42.
25 Ibid., p. 50.
27 Muecke, Textual Spaces, pp. 155-6.
30 Pedersen and Woorunmurra.